

Intervention in the Implementation of the Threshold Policy on Regional Head Nominations by the Golkar Party and the Gerindra Party in West Java

Yollanda Firza Setiawan¹, Arry Bainus¹, Rahmatunnisa¹

¹Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia

Abstract. *The Constitutional Court's efforts to lower the threshold for political parties to fulfill their constitutional rights so that democracy in Indonesia can be healthier, namely by opening opportunities for small parties to nominate candidates for regional heads through a policy contained in Constitutional Court Decision Number 60/PUU-XXII/2024. However, in its implementation, the policy was not chosen and not implemented by political parties. This study focuses on determining what kind of policy threshold implementation interventions were carried out by political parties. The study uses Grindle's policy implementation analysis (2017) policy implementation analysis using qualitative methods and conducting in-depth interviews with deputy coordinator for region 3 of the Golkar party and a member of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) for the Golkar faction in Bandung, and Gerindra party representatives as members of the Central Leadership Council (DPP) of the Gerindra party. The results of the study show that in its implementation, there are triggers for intervention such as affected interests, type of benefit, extent of change envisioned, site of decision making, program implementers, resources committed and power, interests, strategies of actors involved, institutional and regime characteristics, and compliance and responsiveness, which caused the threshold policy for the nomination of governors and deputy governors in West Java in 2024 to not be implemented.*

Keywords: *Policy Implementation, Regional Head Threshold, Regional Head Nomination, Political Parties, Policy Implementation Intervention*

Received: February 4, 2026

Revised: July 19, 2026

Accepted: August 11, 2026

INTRODUCTION

The concept of threshold can be understood as a limitation or boundary (Idrus, 2022). In the context of public policy implementation in Indonesia, the threshold policy functions as a prerequisite that must be fulfilled by an individual or political party in order to nominate candidates and participate in the Pemilu contestation (Taufiqurrohman, 2021; Al-Hamdi et al., 2022). The application of the threshold mechanism in Indonesian elections was first introduced in 2004, with the initial implementation being the presidential threshold (Sumodiningrat, 2021; Rahman et al., 2023). However, the presidential threshold has since been abolished, as the Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) declared that Article 222 contradicts the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945). This decision is stipulated in Mahkamah Konstitusi Decision No. 62/PUU-XXII/2024 (Hanan et al., 2025; Nufus et al., 2024).

As a result, the current electoral system in Indonesia applies only two forms of threshold policies (Sobirin et al., 2026; Saleha et al., 2025; Prasetyo et al., 2021). First, the parliamentary threshold, which is implemented with the objective of strengthening political stability and

preventing excessive parliamentary fragmentation, thereby ensuring controlled growth of political parties (Taufiqurrohman, 2021; Al-Hamdi et al., 2022; Hannan & Kustanto, 2024). Second, the Pilkada threshold.

In 2024, the Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) issued a decision to reduce the threshold requirement from 20 percent of party vote share to a range of 6.5 percent to 10 percent of valid votes, depending on the Daftar Pemilih Tetap (DPT) in each region (Naharuddin & Imran, 2024; Nur, 2025). This policy is stipulated in Mahkamah Konstitusi Decision No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024 and further elaborated through Komisi Pemilihan Umum Regulation No. 10 of 2024, particularly Article 11 concerning the registration requirements for regional head candidate pairs, namely the Pilkada threshold (Rohmah, 2025). This decision was made in response to a constitutional challenge submitted by the Gelora Party and the Labor Party to the Mahkamah Konstitusi, arguing that the 20 percent threshold infringed upon the constitutional rights of political parties (Setiawan et al., 2024). The lawsuit was formally registered under petition number 60/PUU/PAN.MK/AP3/05/2024.

Beyond concerns regarding the violation of political parties' constitutional rights, the application of threshold policies in Indonesia has also attracted substantial criticism (Sukmawan & Pratama, 2023; Anggreani, 2024). According to Titi Anggraini, threshold mechanisms tend to block candidates who do not receive approval from oligarchic elites, allowing dominant political parties to lock in electoral victories and preventing potentially qualified candidates from obtaining the necessary political "ticket" to compete in Pilkada. This occurs despite the fact that political parties in Indonesia are diverse in number, yet this diversity is not proportional to the range and availability of candidates able to compete in regional elections (Dinarto & Ng, 2021).

The reduction of the threshold has therefore received significant public attention and appreciation, being regarded as a positive development and a breath of fresh air for Indonesian democracy, which has recently experienced a decline in democratic quality (Siddha & Fauzi, 2022; Hannan & Kustanto, 2024). The considerations of the MK judges are relevant to current socio-political conditions that have become the focus of public scrutiny. These conditions tend to strengthen oligarchic forces, enabling electoral coalitions to be strategically engineered to produce single-candidate elections either competing against an empty ballot box or against non-eligible candidates while systematically eliminating candidates with strong public support and high potential due to the failure to meet threshold requirements.

The threshold reduction was also welcomed by Perludem (Perkumpulan untuk Pemilu dan Demokrasi), which praised the MK's decision to revise the nomination requirements for Pilkada candidates by aligning them with the percentage requirements for independent candidates. Perludem described the decision as commendable, as it also opens opportunities for parties such as PDI-P to independently nominate candidates, as demonstrated in the Jakarta Pilkada.

Nevertheless, a critical concern remains regarding the implementation of the reduced threshold policy. Despite its intention to protect political parties' constitutional rights and strengthen democratic quality, the policy has faced intervention by political parties during its implementation phase (Hannan & Kustanto, 2024; Prianto, 2024). This phenomenon can be observed in the 2024 Pilkada for the nomination of the Governor and Vice Governor of West Java. Had the threshold remained at 20 percent, the Gerindra Party would have been the only party possessing 20 seats (20 percent) in the West Java Provincial DPRD, enabling it to independently nominate a gubernatorial candidate pair without forming a coalition. However, with the threshold reduced to 6.5 percent in West Java, the policy should have opened opportunities for other parties to nominate candidates independently. In practice, however, this policy was not properly implemented by political parties as policy executors.

This is evidenced by the 2024 West Java Pilkada. Based on the valid vote share of political parties, West Java having the largest Daftar Pemilih Tetap (DPT) in Indonesia, totaling 35,714,901 voters is subject to a 6.5 percent threshold, as its DPT exceeds 12,000,000 voters. Consequently,

the minimum number of votes that must be achieved or exceeded by a political party in order to nominate candidates in the West Java Pilkada is 2,321,468 votes, calculated as follows:

$$6,5\% \times 35.714.901 \text{ DPT}$$

$$\frac{6,5}{100} \times 35.714.901 \text{ DPT} = 2.321.468 \text{ suara}$$

The following presents the vote acquisition of political parties in the West Java electoral district in 2024 that succeeded in surpassing the minimum threshold of 2,321,468 votes, as detailed below:

Table 1. Political Party Vote Share in West Java, 2024.

Political Parties	Total Vote Share	Seat Allocation per Party
Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)	4.301.852	20
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	3.801.216	19
Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)	3.590.621	19
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P)	2.970.222	17

Source: Nasdem, 2024.

In its implementation, although West Java recorded the highest number of gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidate pairs four pairs in total compared to other regions on the island of Java (Tempo, September 26, 2024), the nomination pattern nonetheless reflects limited utilization of the reduced threshold policy. The candidate pairs participating in the 2024 West Java Pilkada are as follows: (1) Acep Adang Ruhiyat–Gitalis Dwi Natarinakursi, nominated by a single political party, namely PKB, which holds 15 seats and obtained 2,850,963 votes; (2) Jeje Wiradinata–Ronal Supradja, nominated by a single political party, PDI-P, which holds 17 seats and obtained 2,970,222 votes; (3) Ahmad Syaikhu–Ilham Akbar Habibie, nominated by a coalition of political parties consisting of Nasdem, holding 8 seats with 1,580,373 votes; PKS, holding 19 seats with 3,801,216 votes; and PPP, holding 6 seats with 1,163,771 votes; (4) Dedi Mulyadi–Erwan Setiawan, nominated by a coalition of political parties comprising Gerindra, holding 20 seats with 4,301,852 votes; Golkar, holding 19 seats with 3,590,621 votes; Demokrat, holding 8 seats with 1,727,060 votes; PAN, holding 7 seats with 1,632,627 votes; and PSI, holding 1 seat with 666,949 votes. Additional support to meet the threshold requirement was provided by political parties without seats in the DPRD that joined the coalition, including Hanura (112,504 votes), Gelora (278,804 votes), Garuda (77,048 votes), PKN (39,798 votes), Partai Buruh (342,806 votes), PBB (126,177 votes), and Partai Ummat (127,694 votes).

The four gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidate pairs contesting the Pilkada, only two were nominated independently by single political parties. Ideally, political parties should have been able to present a greater range of leadership alternatives to the electorate, with at least five gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidate pairs in West Java, without forming large-scale coalitions. This condition indicates that the policy was not implemented in a comprehensive and effective manner. Based on in-depth interviews conducted by the author with the Regional Coordinator Deputy for Area III, who also serves as a member of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) of the Golkar faction in Bandung City, several factors were identified. First, party interests significantly influenced decisions, particularly the strategic objective of winning the Pilkada. Second, the perceived benefits generated by a lower threshold policy were considered smaller than those obtained through coalition-building. Third, the magnitude of change demanded by the policy was viewed as posing potential risks to the party. Fourth, although the Mahkamah Konstitusi decision is final and binding and holds strong legal authority, Golkar ultimately adhered to directives issued by the Central Executive Board (DPP) during implementation. Fifth, policy implementation involved multiple stakeholders. Sixth, Golkar acknowledged that it lacked sufficient internal resources, particularly qualified party cadres.

The context of implementation, several conditions were identified. First, the DPP acts as the central authority within the party, prioritizing electoral victory in the Pilkada, with coalition-building serving as a strategic instrument for party actors. Second, the decision not to fully implement the reduced threshold policy was also influenced by institutional characteristics of the ruling regime, as Golkar aligned itself with the objectives of the Koalisi Indonesia Maju (KIM). Third, Golkar demonstrated formal compliance and responsiveness by adhering to the MK decision and conducting candidate surveys to assess the feasibility of nominating internal cadres in the Pilkada. Research on threshold policies as stipulated in Mahkamah Konstitusi Decision No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024 has been examined from various analytical perspectives. Legal research approaches have emphasized the potential of the decision to expand political participation and enhance representation in regional head elections. From a legal perspective, the decision has also been regarded as beneficial for democratic development. Furthermore, juridical analyses and normative juridical perspectives highlight that the Mahkamah Konstitusi issued a significant ruling that has influenced political dynamics and the regional head election system in Indonesia. To identify research trends related to threshold policies, the author employed VOSviewer visualization by limiting the scope of prior studies published between 2017 and 2025. Data collection was conducted using the Publish or Perish application with Google Scholar as the database, employing the keywords “threshold,” “president,” “Pilkada,” and “Mahkamah Konstitusi Decision.” The resulting visualization illustrates the following research trends:




Figure 1. VOSviewer Visualization of Threshold Research Trends

Source: Author, 2025.

Based on the visualization above, it can be observed that research on threshold policies in Indonesia remains relatively limited. The visualization reveals a dominant blue cluster, with the key term threshold at its core, indicating that existing studies primarily focus on parliamentary thresholds, statutory regulations, and Pemilu-related issues. In addition, several studies address threshold policies in relation to electoral thresholds, Constitutional Court decisions, PUU-XXII as the designation of Mahkamah Konstitusi rulings, and constitutional law.

This study is specifically focused on examining the forms of intervention in the implementation of threshold policies carried out by political parties. The analysis employs Grindle’s (2017) policy implementation framework, as previously outlined, which identifies empirical findings that are consistent with Grindle’s perspective on policy implementation. Accordingly, this research utilizes two main analytical variables: content of policy and context of implementation.

METHODS

Research Design

This study employed a qualitative research approach to examine the perspectives, experiences, and organizational practices of political party actors in relation to the issue under investigation. A qualitative design was considered appropriate because it enables the researcher to obtain in-depth information regarding the views, interpretations, and experiences of political actors within their institutional and political contexts. The study focused on two political parties, namely the Golkar Party and the Gerindra Party, which provided complementary perspectives from party representatives operating at the regional level.

Participants and Data Collection

The primary data were obtained through semi-structured, in-depth interviews with selected political party representatives who were considered to possess relevant knowledge and experience regarding the research topic. The informants were selected purposively based on their organizational positions, involvement in party activities, and capacity to provide substantive information relevant to the study. Data collection was conducted through two interview procedures. First, an online interview was conducted via Zoom with a representative of the Golkar Party who serves as Deputy Coordinator for Regional Area III and as a member of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) of the Golkar faction in Bandung City. Second, face-to-face, in-depth interviews were conducted with two officials of the Regional Executive Board (DPW) of the Gerindra Party in West Java. These informants were selected because their organizational positions provided direct access to information concerning party perspectives, organizational practices, and political dynamics at the regional level.

The interviews followed a semi-structured format, allowing the researcher to use predetermined questions while providing sufficient flexibility to explore issues that emerged during the interviews. The interview process focused on the informants' perceptions, institutional experiences, organizational practices, and interpretations of the issues examined in the study. Interview data were documented, organized, and subsequently prepared for systematic analysis. In addition to primary interview data, secondary data were collected to strengthen the empirical basis of the study and provide contextual information for interpreting the interview findings. Secondary sources included peer-reviewed academic journal articles, books, official or institutional publications where relevant, and news reports published through online and print media. The use of multiple sources enabled the researcher to contextualize the statements obtained from informants and to compare interview findings with information available in the broader literature and public discourse.

Data Analysis

The qualitative data were analyzed using the interactive model of qualitative data analysis developed by Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña. The analysis consisted of three interconnected stages: data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. Data condensation involved selecting, simplifying, organizing, and focusing the interview and documentary data according to themes relevant to the research objectives. At this stage, information that was substantively relevant to the research questions was identified and categorized, while repetitive or unrelated information was excluded from further analysis. The condensed data were subsequently presented in a structured form to facilitate the identification of relationships, patterns, and recurring themes across the informants and data sources. Comparisons were made between information obtained from the Golkar and Gerindra representatives, while secondary sources were used to provide contextual support and identify points of convergence or divergence. The final stage involved drawing and verifying conclusions by continuously examining the consistency of emerging interpretations against the available empirical evidence. This iterative process was undertaken to ensure that the conclusions reflected the interview data and were not based solely on individual statements or isolated

observations. To strengthen the credibility of the findings, the study also applied source comparison by examining information obtained from different informants and corroborating relevant interview findings with secondary sources. This process helped identify consistent patterns as well as differences in perspectives among political party representatives and provided a more contextualized interpretation of the research findings.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Head Area Governor and Representative Governor Java West Content of Policy

Interest Affected

The sub-variable interest affected which is included in the variable content of policy, in Grindle (2017) states that the lower the level of conformity between the interests of the target group and the objectives of the policy, the lower the level of success of the implementation of the policy.

The findings of the three political parties in terms of interest affected were that firstly, party Gerindra as party with amount ownership acquisition The highest vote share in West Java, specifically, was achieved with 20 seats and 4,301,852 votes. Represented by Iyan and Ratih as members of the Regional Executive Board. (DPW) Java West, that party Gerindra own interest Electoral success and maintaining power are the ultimate goals of regional elections. Gerindra aims to win the election by maintaining and expanding its voter base. The Gerindra party also revealed that there are vested interests among each party. party leaders who came and expressed their commitment and will carry out nomination together so that party Gerindra welcome in a way The coalition's positive impact indicates a low level of alignment between the policy's objectives and those of the Gerindra Party. Although the lowered threshold allows political parties to nominate independent candidates, thereby fulfilling their constitutional rights, the policy's objectives are inconsistent with Gerindra's goal of winning the regional elections, necessitating the need to maintain and expand its voter base. existence difference interest, make party Gerindra No driven to implement policies.

Second, party PKS Which represented by Iwan Herman as secretary BP3 Agency Winning Election Also as chairman assembly balance area The 2025-2030 period, with Iman Lestariyono, the legal secretary of the PKS party and chairman of Commission IV of the Bandung City DPRD, as speakers, shared a common goal with the Gerindra party. Both stated that the PKS's goal in the election is, of course, to win. Furthermore, PKS prioritizes other interests, namely, seeking For involving cadre into the nomination Regional elections, so that PKS can provide the best alternative candidates for the community so that they can be elected objective And answer What Which required by public. So that In the 2024 gubernatorial candidacy in West Java, the PKS party nominated Ahmad Syaikh, a prominent figure and cadre of the PKS. Regarding the implementation by PKS No implemented in a way intact, that There is interest affected which influenced PKS to win the regional elections. The success rate of the implementation Still low, Because PKS Still do coalition with Nasdem, although one of PKS's goals in nominating Ahmad Syaikh, who is a party cadre, has been fulfilled.

Third, party Golkar with source person that is Iqbal Mohamad Usman as a representative field coordinator region area election 3 at a time member DPD Golkar faction in Bandung City. Iqbal revealed that his party has an interest in follow rule formal as party national Because The Constitutional Court's decision is final and binding, so the party has an interest in maintaining legal legitimacy by complying with the Constitutional Court's rules. However, it cannot be denied that Golkar Party members have their own internal interests. that is interest from center DPP For carry out What Which become an ideal coalition Indonesia proceed for operate creative. Interest Another factor is the electoral interest in winning the regional elections, so that the consideration of which figures to support and run in the contest is based on the electability of the figures and other internal political calculations, thereby increasing the Golkar Party's chances of victory. The interests affected and prioritized by Golkar differ in their alignment with policy objectives.

Therefore, these differing interests discourage Golkar from implementing policies and result in low implementation success.

Based on the findings presented above, it shows that implementation policy No walk in a way optimal Because existence interest affected. That the low level of alignment between the interests of the party as the implementer policy with objective from policy in Decision MK No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024. The differing interests and strategies of political parties in exploiting the opportunity to lower the threshold have resulted in varying commitments to the policy. This is evident in the differing policy objectives, namely that the threshold policy for gubernatorial and deputy gubernatorial nominations in Constitutional Court Decision No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024 was decided to be implemented, thus opening up opportunities. party political in submit figure candidate to public No immediately implemented by political parties capable of achieving the threshold of 6.5%. With the interests of both parties, namely Gerindra and Golkar, there are interests (interests affected) that influence the parties as policy implementers to not implement the policy fully. Interests such as the desire to win the regional elections, electoral interests to maintain and expand the voter base, interests to commit and communicate between parties, as well as the interests of the central DPP to implement astracipta with the national coalition that was previously formed in the presidential and vice presidential elections.

Whereas party PKS, can it is said different with second party Others. Indeed, one of PKS's goals is to win the regional elections, but with PKS's interest in nominating internal PKS cadres, this party implemented a threshold by nominating its cadres Ahmad Sheikh as candidate governor, although No in a way intact Because PKS coalition with Nasdem Which his party No reach threshold 6.5%.

Type of Benefits (Type Benefit Which Obtained)

type of benefit hypothesis states, the more unclear the benefits generated and intended by a policy for the target group, the lower the level of participation and support provided by the target group in its implementation. The following are the findings of the type of benefit from the three parties: the Gerindra Party in the West Java Regional Executive Council (DPW). represented by yes and Ratih Joseph as administrator DPW, say The Gerindra Party, as a major party, is of the view that the policy of lowering the threshold is a good thing and will have a positive impact on society because more candidates will be present, and they also stated that party get benefit Because with the decline threshold so directly and No direct will strengthen base voters. However Returning to the initial goals and interests of the Gerindra Party, which is to win the regional elections, the policy's intended benefits for the target group are limited to opening up opportunity For submit candidate in a way independent, whereas Gerindra has an interest in winning the regional elections as a strategy and the clearer benefits of achieving victory by forming a large coalition to strengthen its vote base and ward off fragmentation. Therefore, Gerindra is not motivated to implement this strategy, and Gerindra's participation is low. its implementation, and only limited to give opinion that This policy is a good thing.

Meanwhile, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), represented by Iwan Hermawan and Iman Lestariyono, views the policy of lowering the threshold percentage as a general opportunity for mid-sized political parties. For the PKS party, which has around 8% of the vote, it will certainly be very advantageous. Going forward, there will be increased representation, increased political competition, and strengthened participation. public with presence variation candidate leader head area. PKS also sees that this policy will have an impact and be beneficial for the health of democracy. in the future in Indonesia Which later start faded. That the intended benefits for the target group, namely PKS, are considered clear and profitable. However determination policy moment injury time make PKS still maintain the coalition Which Already formed And taken into account far away day. So that PKS support for the policy is low.

Party Golkar Which represented by Iqbal, disclose that benefit the short-term benefit of lowering the threshold policy is that it strengthens the grassroots to prevent clashes between supporters. However, his party, Golkar, decided to form a coalition based on the long-term

benefits it would receive. Iqbal stated that in a political system, coalitions provide greater benefits. In politics and governance, will There is policy Which formulated and eat perception from each political party. That each political party has its own interests in formulating policies, so that coalition strong with potential big chosen. So that, low participation of Golkar parties in policy.

Based on results findings on, type of benefits from implementation The policy did not show optimal results. Although the three political parties, namely Gerindra, PKS, and Golkar, also acknowledged that the policy of lowering the threshold limit (threshold) specifically in nomination head area governor and the deputy governor in West Java provides benefits for each political party, especially benefits in the form of a variety of candidates who will be present and offered to public, benefit in the form of strengthening electoral And root grass, benefits in the form of strengthening and improving the health of democracy in the future, but these benefits are not all as well as immediately make party brave nominate in a way independent cadre each party. As Iqbal stated, the Golkar Party prefers to form a coalition rather than implement policies in their entirety, stating that the benefits of the policy are smaller than the benefits that would be gained from a coalition, especially when victory and government are implemented.

Returning again to the aim of the policy to be able to open up opportunities for parties to be able to nominate candidates so that this actually provides benefits for party Which previously No can nominate in a way independent, however can not denied that objective And interest third party the is To win, not just to the stage of nominating candidates. Coalitions are perceived as having clearer benefits and making it easier to achieve the goal of winning, resulting in low participation in this policy because the coalition is ultimately chosen by the party.

Extent of Change Envision (Range Change Which are Expected)

Extent of change envision in Grindle (2017), that the more big degree of change social Which sued by policy, so the more tall resistance target group implementing actors for implementation. In its implementation, Iyan and Ratih Yosep, who represented the Gerindra party, said that the Gerindra party itself was of the opinion that the policy of reducing... percent number threshold will become chance in expansion small parties to be able to compete, in accordance with the changes expected from the threshold policy itself. Iyan also believes that the lowering of the threshold number will make change in division voice party. So that, Gerindra Party as implementer policy No pushed For Implementing policies and having high resistance to policies, Gerindra continues to adjust so as not to lose dominance, so it continues to choose to form a coalition.

In contrast to the Gerindra Party's response, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), represented by Iwan Hermawan and Iman Lestariyono, expressed that the degree of change demanded by the policy in Constitutional Court Decision No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024 is viewed by PKS as opening opportunities for smaller parties, and that this policy will result in significant change and a healthy democracy. Furthermore, with this lowered threshold, future elections offer hope that PKS can nominate itself with thorough preparation. However, For region Java West Alone PKS No change position when The new threshold rule was implemented. This decision was made because the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) felt that the Constitutional Court's decision, issued at injury time, was problematic for PKS, as it excluded the concept from being included in the party's planning components well in advance. Furthermore, there were significant risks involved in making coalition changes mid-term or late in the election. Therefore, given the significant changes expected by the policy and the limited time available, PKS was not motivated to implement the policy. PKS became resistant to the policy's implementation in the gubernatorial and deputy gubernatorial nominations in West Java in the 2024 election.

Regarding the Golkar Party, Iqbal, as a Golkar representative, believes that the policy change resulting from the lowering of the threshold will strengthen the grassroots and electoral system. The problems that previously occurred during the presidential election, which divided the party into two camps, known as "cebong" and "kampret," will make it easier to regulate

clashes between grassroots supporters. However, change policy risky to opportunity victory the party that become objective party will disturbed. So that Golkar No pushed to implement policies and resistance to policies, so that implementation does not run.

Based on the findings that have been presented above regarding the degree of change required by the policy in lowering the threshold number, PKS stated that lowering this threshold will bring about changes that... Good for health democracy in Indonesia. Also change for internal benefits party That Alone in the form of chance Which open for parties small to be able to nominate their candidates and electoral strengthening answered by representatives of the Golkar Party and the Gerindra Party. This shows that the large degree of change expected through the Constitutional Court Decision No. 60 / PUU- XXII / 2024 from the pattern of regional head nominations from the nomination system that in the previous policy was a dominant coalition system that changed towards party independence. However, the large degree of change demanded by the policy, coupled with the policy being set at injury time, makes the high resistance from party as implementer And group target policy. This is evident from the three parties that did not implement the policy by taking advantage of the opportunities that had been opened. Also, on the one hand, the parties that want to maintain domination with strengthen voice so that No divided.

Site of Decision Making (Implementation Decision -Making)

Policy implementation through the Site of decision-making variable in Grindle (2017) formulates that when the policy making position does not have... legitimacy Which strong so implementation policy tend experiencing obstacles. In policy implementation, who holds the authority to implement the policy and to what extent are stakeholders given authority in the decisions taken and other changes, both substantive and technical.

Regarding the policies that have been set, Iyan and Ratih Yosep from the Gerindra party

revealed that the Constitutional Court's decision to lower the threshold was affairs parties Which There is in on, for maker policy And Gerindra responded positively by accepting the policy. However, in its implementation, the entire party adhered to the decisions taken and implemented in nominating regional heads supported and nominated by the party, including the decision not to fully implement the policy by choosing a coalition. from each leadership center party (DPP). Like party Gerindra which represented Yes, Which disclose that party Gerindra in The final determination of the candidate's candidacy and official stance on policy is determined at the central level by Gerindra Party Chairman Prabowo Subianto. However, this does not rule out the possibility of input from lower levels of the party, such as Branch Leadership Councils and Regional Leadership Councils, in nominating candidates. This demonstrates that the Constitutional Court, as a policymaker, lacks the legitimacy to force the party to comply with policy. This is evident in its implementation. that Gerindra comply And operate What Which The DPP decides this with a single command. Consequently, policy implementation tends to encounter obstacles and discourages Gerindra from implementing it.

This is not much different from the Golkar Party's decision-making system, which involves determining which candidates to support and deciding on coalitions. As Iqbal stated, the Golkar Party, particularly in West Java, has an interest in in follow rule formal as party national Because Constitutional Court decision is decision Which nature final and binding so that party is interested in maintaining legal legitimacy by complying with the Constitutional Court's rules. However, in its implementation, Golkar follows the central decision of the Central Executive Board (DPP). However, it does not rule out the possibility that for the nomination of a figure, there will be a recommendation from the DPP, which is comprised of Golkar cadres. Each nominated figure will then be reviewed based on their highest electability. In the 2024 regional elections, Dedi Mulyadi, who received electability highest so that DPP decide For coalition and nominated Dedi Mulyadi. It highlights that Golkar complies with the Constitutional Court's policy to maintain its legitimacy in the legal realm, indicating that Golkar believes the Constitutional Court has strong legal legitimacy. However, this is different when it enters politics, where implementation is... will

comply decision center DPP, matter This signify that the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court in politics tends to be weak, so that policy implementation tends to experience obstacles and makes Golkar not encouraged to implement policies.

Regarding the PKS, Iman Lestariyono stated that his party respects the Constitutional Court's decision, and that if the policy is appealed or rejected, it will require a lengthy process. Furthermore, regarding the negotiation process for nominating gubernatorial and deputy gubernatorial candidates within the PKS itself, there are differences between the Gerindra and Golkar parties. Iwan Hermawan explained that the party has the responsibility and authority to send... partner candidate Also in do negotiation is DPW leadership. Then the DPW formed a team to conduct political communication. Iwan also revealed that for matters related to the Decree (SK) in decision DPW carry figure candidate, will submitted to the Central Executive Board. For the PKS party itself, the candidates it nominates are usually national figures. Like the Golkar Party, PKS respects the Constitutional Court's ruling and considers the Constitutional Court to have strong legal legitimacy. However, if... switch to process implementation field, so DPW Which will be determining the direction of candidacy. This indicates that the Constitutional Court's legitimacy in politics tends to be weak, so that policy implementation tends to experience obstacles.

Based on the explanation regarding how the site of decision making is implemented, it can be seen that the Constitutional Court (MK) as an institution has strong legitimacy in law, but its legitimacy is weak in politics, so that policy implementation tends to experience obstacles. Like Which expressed by Iqbal from party Golkar, that his party is guarding legitimacy law MK with follow rule formal, However moment The position shifts to political implementation, the party is more obedient to the DPP. The implementation of decision-making takes place, in deciding not to implement the policy that in general each political party only follows decision And order from leadership highest party political Which is in the Central Leadership Council (DPP) so that the top down system is often implemented. Like party Gerindra And Golkar Which obedient to What Which to be an order from center, although No cover Also that party lower party such as DPW, member And and so on still There is effort For propose figure For progress. However, it is slightly different from the concept of complying with what has been decided. by DPP, party PKS in implementation taking decision to nominate a figure Ahmad Syaikh is within the scope and authority of the DPW, that DPP only just give signature letter decision as form of administrative requirements.

Program Implementers (Implementor Policy)

Weak coordination between stakeholders in policy-implementing agencies will result in policies not being implemented optimally. Various threshold policy implementers are involved in the nomination process, including during the campaign process and the final stages of the election, each of whom is involved within each political party. Iyan and Ratih Yosep from the Gerindra Party revealed that throughout the process, the Gerindra Party involved all internal structures. Starting from the DPC, DPD, DPW which conduct candidate selection, including party wings such as Perempuan Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesian Women), Gerakan Kristen Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesian Christian Movement) (GEKIRA), then the party's social media team tasked with public outreach and communication. However, strong coordination and the large number of parties involved do not always benefit and can implement policies well, this still makes Gerindra not motivated to implement policies.

For party PKS, Iwan Herman disclose that his party in implementation policy in nominate governor And representative governor is structure internal DPP, DPW Also including Body Winning Election (BP3) In the Golkar Party, Iqbal stated that all parties involved in the implementation of the regional elections (Pilkada). Implementers, including the chairman, members, administrators, cadres, and party wings, were also involved. Iqbal also mentioned the role of the General Elections Commission (KPU). involved, especially after knock hammer legitimate his decision MK about threshold. The KPU is involved in how to provide education and

counseling directly to each party political about policy Which new, How the policy concept of this threshold can be used and implemented by the party. Strong coordination and a large number of parties involved do not always benefit and enable effective policy implementation. This continues to discourage PKS and Golkar from implementing the policy.

Interviews revealed that the three parties, PKS, Gerindra, and Golkar, have numerous policy implementers. These implementers range from the General Elections Commission (KPU), the Central Executive Board (DPP), the Regional Leadership Council (DPW), the Regional Leadership Council (DPPD), cadres, members, and party wings. Furthermore, there are no signs of weak coordination between implementing agencies. policy. Related with many implementer And strong coordination should have its own advantages especially that the West Java region with DPT most will Can handled with Good so that can nominate candidates head area governor And representative governor in a way independent. However coordination power Which happen in implementation policy on nomination head area governor And representative governor in Java West shows No always the large number of related agencies is beneficial.

Resources Committed (Source Power Which Are Available)

The resources in question can be various, both human and non-human. According to Grindle (2017), resources will influence the success rate of policy implementation. Limited resources will significantly reduce the effectiveness of policy implementation. In its implementation, the three political parties nominating governor and deputy governor in West Java for the 2024 election revealed that their parties did not lack resources.

Iyan and Ratih Yosep from the Gerindra party said that the Gerindra party is party Which big so that no lack source Power. This can be seen from the abundant human resources such as internal parties, volunteers, wing party and team technical. So also with source Power financial and logistics, which can be said to be abundant, from volunteers to support the gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates nominated by Gerindra. Gerindra's abundant resources refute Grindle's (2017) concept of variable resources commitment, which states that limited resources will reduce implementation effectiveness. Although Gerindra's resources are adequate, they do not encourage Gerindra to implement policies, and policies remain poorly implemented.

So also with source Power Which owned by PKS, that In fact, to implement the threshold policy for independent nomination is not to become problem party, that PKS own source Power Which Enough Such as human resources in the form of party cadres to be nominated, as well as financial resources. Iwan Hermawan also revealed that if his party encounters a shortage, it will seek a candidate pair capable of sharing the costs. For can operate contestation Regional Election in a way together And This is certainly a major undertaking and requires significant resources. Therefore, resources are not the primary obstacle preventing PKS from fully and independently supporting its cadres.

Matter similar Also expressed by Iqbal that party Golkar Which included in party big 4 own source Power Which abundant. Iqbal revealed that source Power is not become problem for party Golkar. That Golkar members are very numerous, plus administrators, party wings, and so on. volunteers Which available until root grass. Also source Power financial which are available from donation member board. So also with source Power Regarding logistics, Iqbal also mentioned that there were instructions for council members to help with logistical needs such as banners, billboards and so on which came from personal funding to support gubernatorial and deputy gubernatorial candidates. However, Iqbal also revealed that the availability of candidates from within the Golkar party itself will still depend on internal calculations. that before carry Dedi Mulyadi, party Golkar had time Several names were proposed, including Mr. Iswara and even Ridwan Kamil, but RK ultimately chose to run for governor of Jakarta. This highlights the potential for victory and the potential for interest. big public to figure Dedi Mulyadi become consideration. Golkar Also No close possibility for can submit the candidate independently if there are Golkar Party cadres who appeal to the public. Although Golkar possesses abundant resources, such as financial and logistical resources, it lacks qualified cadres with high electability. Therefore, the

limited human resources (cadres) are a problem and one of the reasons why Golkar is not encouraged to nominate candidates independently.

The results of the presentation regarding the abundance of resources owned by the party, including human, financial and logistical resources, are acknowledged as not being... reason as problem for party with No nominate their candidates independently. What happened in policy implementation, particularly in the Gerindra Party, refutes the variable resourced-committed hypothesis put forward by Grindle (2017). However, it cannot be denied that the PKS Party, if it needs financial resources, will seek a partner willing to share the costs. Golkar acknowledged that there are calculations regarding resources in the form of party cadres who do not have electability tall so that Golkar more decide For No brave in nominating its cadres independently as candidates for governor and deputy governor.

Results Research and Discussion Context of Implementation

Power, Interest, and Strategies of Actor Involved

That in Grindle (2017), each policy actor involved has different interests to achieve which are also accompanied by the strength and scope of power they have to be able to achieve the desired interests. That in its implementation, expressed by Iyan and also Ratih Yosep from the Gerindra party, the Gerindra DPP is the power holder, especially in deciding to nominate candidates and the final decision. There is on proposal leadership team highest, that is DPP. However, they Which While in the highest positions, decisions are still made based on considerations, proposals, and suggestions from below. Therefore, the scope of the DPP's power and authority influence Gerindra to not be encouraged to implement policies. This is no different for those in power within the Golkar Party. Iqbal disclose that party DPP Which decide for support and nominate who will advance as candidates for governor and deputy governor. Strength DPP Also make Golkar No pushed for implementing policies in West Java as a regional scope.

However, different from the Gerindra and Golkar parties, the party holds the power to decide on the nomination of governor and deputy governor in West Java. including decision in coalition party PKS held by Board Leader Region (DPW) Java West That Alone, including communication political, and do consideration. For task or What Which done by DPP in The PKS party only signed the Decree (SK). The Regional Leadership Council (DPW), as the power holder, determined the party's direction, not fully implementing the policy. (Sampe, 2021; Yusra et al., 2022; Ikhsan et al., 2024). So strength DPP And DPW with coverage power in each Political parties determine the implementation steps, thus making policy implementation not run optimally, which makes political parties not motivated to implement policies. (Prianto, 2024; Sampe, 2021; Rohmah, 2025)

About interest (interest) each from third party They have the same interest, namely winning the regional election contest. Iyan and Ratih stated that the Gerindra Party certainly has the desire to remain a party winner. So also with party Golkar, Iqbal disclose The Golkar Party's decision to nominate Dedi Mulyadi and Erwan Setiawan was based on their high electability and potential to win the election. Iqbal Also emphasize that existence interest from center for follow The ideas and ideals of the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (KIM). Meanwhile, Iwan Hermawan, a member of the PKS party, stated that the PKS party certainly has an interest in winning the regional elections, but it also has a vested interest in nominating candidates from within the party. Therefore, the differing interests of each political party hinder the three parties from implementing policies, and these party interests also hinder the full implementation of policies. (Syafhendry et al., 2023; Al Syahrin, 2024; Jayanto, 2025; Sitorus et al., 2025)

With the goal of winning the regional elections, each political party has its own strategy. For Gerindra, Iyan revealed that his party compile strategy for do coalition. Strategy This This was done to strengthen and broaden the base of victory. This coalition strategy was acknowledged as a result of the desire of each element of the party leadership to work together. Iyan also argued that if the Gerindra Party stood and operated alone, gaining a strong base of

votes would not be guaranteed, although this does not mean the Gerindra Party lacks confidence. Iyan provided example like party PDI-P And PKB Which stand Alone However the voice becomes incomplete, especially for parties with a religious basis such as PKB, that the voice with base religious in Java West Also No ensure will achieved in its entirety. By Because That coalition chosen as strategy for can reach What which is in the party's interest. So that the party is not encouraged to implement policies (Manalu & Nurhandjati, 2021; Rusnaedy et al., 2021; Ashari et al., 2025)

So also with strategy from party Golkar For win Election. Iqbal revealed that the party had previously conducted a survey to assess Golkar's capabilities, especially after the threshold was lowered. Golkar Also do consideration and calculation If nominate cadres Which owned by Golkar For proceed Regional Election 2024. Cadre where Which It is suitable to be proposed considering the culture of the region itself, but from the cadres who are seen and have potential, they are still less electable than Dedi Mulyadi. Therefore, the coalition is a party strategy that makes the decision carry Dedi Mulyadi and Erwan Setiawan after do Considerations and calculations, particularly regarding the candidate's high electability in West Java, are crucial. Coalitions are also a party strategy for capturing grassroots votes, making this strategy a potential victory for the party. Golkar And For reach interest Golkar, so party No driven to implement policies. (Waisapi, 2024; Holqi et al., 2025; Nadira Kusuma & Rohmaning, 2025)

Strategy from party PKS For become winner Election that is with keep prioritizing interest from party. Iwan Herman emphasize that PKS certainly wants to win the election, but PKS remains on track to still offer cadre the best to public Java West. Therefore, PKS decided not to join a grand coalition and instead formed a coalition with the Nasdem Party as a strategy. Therefore, PKS offered Ahmad as a candidate. Sheikh as cadre PKS For proceed in Regional Election Governor Java West in 2024 and make PKS not in a way fully implement the policy. (Yusra et al., 2022; Prianto et al., 2022; Islam & Suryani, 2026)

In the variables of Power, Interests, and Strategy, the actors involved are visible. that third variable This influence party political No pushed to nominate their candidates even though the opportunities are wide open and this variable is also influential to decision party political for coalition. Like The power variable, that the DPP as the holder of the highest power in the political party is the reason that the DPW follows what is ordered and becomes the decision of the DPP. The interest variable, that each party has its main interest, namely winning the regional elections, but each party also has other interests such as strengthening the victory base, and nominating cadres internal party. So that variable strategy actor Which involved is coalitions to achieve and achieve their interests. However, unlike the PKS party, which prioritizes nominating internal party cadres, the PKS's strategy is to nominate its cadres in the 2024 gubernatorial election despite forming a coalition with Nasdem, whose party did not reach the threshold for deputy governor. (Noor et al., 2021; Ridwan & Fatkhuri, 2023; Nur, 2025; Sisilia et al., 2026).

Institution and Regime Characteristics (Characteristics of The Institutions of The Ruling Regime)

Grindle (2017) different that implementation policy will influenced by political dynamics including the dominance of a party in government regime And system government Which implemented. Matter This reinforced by the reality of implementation in the field. Iyan and Ratih acknowledged that the Gerindra Party as party big owner voice most at a time winner, especially in the current period, making other parties come over and commit for operate Regional Election in a way Together. Iqbal Also confirming and strengthening this by stating that usually the formulation in the national election contest will follow down to the governor level. Party Golkar choose follow What Which become ideals from The Advanced Indonesia Coalition (KIM) believes that there are ideas and ideals, especially now that Prabowo Subianto won the presidential election with his creative vision for Indonesia, that must align with the existing coalition's struggle. Therefore, the party must Golkar follow coalition Which is at in Center, that is join with KIM in Regional Election governor and representative governor in Java West This. So that proven

that institutional and regime characteristics influence the lack of encouragement of the Gerindra and Golkar parties to implement policies.

Disagreeing with the Gerindra and Golkar parties, Iwan Hermawan and Iman Lestariyono stated that the PKS's decision to vote for the regional elections was not influenced by what happened at the national level. Iwan Hermawan stated that once the national presidential and vice-presidential contest is over, the matter is over. Iwan Hermawan also confirmed that the PKS party had communicated with almost all party including party Gerindra And PDI-P to make an impression. However, the results of the communication did not always result in a decision that a PKS cadre would become deputy governor. Iwan Hermawan also confirm that no as well as immediately become benchmark that party PKS must join a coalition with Gerindra, even though the coalition is the national winner. PKS see situation And How condition in Java West That Alone. PKS remains committed to promoting its cadres, thus choosing to form a coalition with the Nasdem Party. Therefore, PKS believes that institutional and regime characteristics are not a factor in the party's failure to implement policies. (Sampe, 2021; Dinarto & Ng, 2021; Prianto et al., 2022; Syafhendry et al., 2023; Prianto, 2024)

From presentation results interview in on, that of course Correct institutions and the characteristics of the ruling regime influence the implementation of policies to utilize the threshold. The Gerindra and Golkar parties acknowledged that the parties' decision not to nominate independent candidates and more choose for form and still is at in coalition big Because existence factor victory on level national on Election president and the previous vice president was won by Prabowo Subianto so automatically make party Gerindra dominate. However matter This Also denied by PKS, that matters relating to the presidential election will be resolved once the activities have been completed Election so also finished matter other, victory Prabowo And Gerindra's party No require PKS Also combined into the Coalition big. This denial is supported by the PKS nominating its cadre as a gubernatorial candidate and its unaffected national coalition, KIM. Therefore, institutional and regime characteristics have no influence and are not a reason for PKS's lack of incentive to implement the policy. (Rusnaedy et al., 2021; Noor et al., 2021; Asrinaldi et al., 2022; Herdiansah et al., 2022; Subekti et al., 2023; Jayanto, 2025; Rohmah, 2025; Pratama et al., 2026).

Compliance and Responsiveness (Compliance And responsiveness)

Compliance, responsiveness, consistency, loyalty in implementing policies. Power responsive in the form of How actor implementer adapt with the policy, how they provide support and feedback in response to the policy, and how policy implementing actors allocate resources so that the objectives of the policy can be achieved. Low levels of compliance and reception group target to policy, will negatively impact the success of implementation. As a form of responsiveness of the Gerindra party, Iyan revealed that regarding the latest policy of reducing the threshold, the Gerindra party responded by welcoming it positively, both from the leadership elements. And overall party. Matter This Because party Gerindra prioritize nationalism and public interest, as long as it is good for society in general. but for compliance compliance to policy, party Gerindra In its implementation, it continues to form coalitions with other parties also members of the KIM. Consequently, Gerindra's low level of compliance negatively impacts policy implementation. Response party Golkar, Iqbal say that response party Good Internally, down to the grassroots, the Constitutional Court has decided to follow the laws that follow. As a form of compliance, the Golkar Party, as the policy implementer, responded by taking the initiative. do calculation political Also survey to public and looking at the situation of West Java itself. Are Golkar party cadres one of the resources they have, with several names, one of which is Ridwan Kamil, having high electability so they have the opportunity to nominate cadres? from Golkar in a way independent. So low level compliance Golkar, also has a negative impact and the policy is not implemented.

The PKS party also expressed a positive response to the threshold reduction. PKS, represented by Iwan Hermawan and Iman Lestariyono, welcomed this move. This was especially

true for PKS. Which incidentally acquisition voice in a way national Still in range 8%, Of course It's also beneficial. Lowering the threshold also benefits parties that don't have seats but have legitimate votes. The PKS party must move quickly and strive to be adaptive, responding quickly, and adjusting. Iman Lestariyono reveal that decision MK No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024 Which The decision during injury time left the PKS party in a dilemma, between supporting national figures and PKS cadres or joining a grand coalition. The lowering of the threshold during injury time also prevented the party from immediately changing its stance. position. Faith Lestariyono confess that as response from the majority, especially in districts and cities, chose to ignore the policy and continue with the coalition they had already established. With this policy in place, as a form of compliance, PKS decided to respond by supporting cadre figures. from internal PKS Alone, with carry Ahmad Sheikh And in coalition with Nasdem, with agree candidate representative governor from marriage Nasdem That is Ilham Habibie. That PKS has complied with the policy, although not completely. The results of the above presentation indicate that political parties' responsiveness to the threshold reduction is inversely proportional to their compliance. All three political parties responded positively to the lowering threshold for regional head nominations. Political parties also moved to assess their chances of victory in response to the threshold reduction, as their parties had an open opportunity to nominate candidates. However, the parties' responsiveness to the policy failed to encourage compliance and implementation, particularly for Golkar and Gerindra, which remained strong within their established large coalitions, and for PKS, which failed to fully implement the policy.

Threshold Policy for Nominating Governors and Deputy Governors in West Java With ATLAS.ti Visualization Network Threshold Regional Election Java West Gerindra Party




Figure 2. Visualization Network ATLAS.ti Threshold Regional Election Gerindra Java West

Based on the results of the analysis through network mapping using ATLAS.ti on the West Java Gerindra Party DPW using the policy implementation theory (Grindle, 2017), it was found that the implementation of the threshold policy contained in the Supreme Court Decision Constitution Number 60/PUU-XXII/2024 is at in dynamics Which complex so that when this policy is published or ratified it does not immediately create party political pushed For submit candidate specifically governor and deputy governor without forming a coalition. As can be seen

in the image above, the Gerindra political party's lack of encouragement to implement the policy was influenced by by two dimensions main that is content of policy in the form of interest affected, type of benefits, extent of change envision , And site of decision making Which marked with green and the context of implementation in the form of power, interest and strategies of actor involved, institution & regime characteristic And compliance & responsiveness is marked with orange color.

In terms of policy content, affected interests, such as cross-party communication and commitment, electoral interests, and the need to expand the voter base to win regional elections, influenced the Gerindra Party's decision to form a coalition. Regarding the type of benefit, the Gerindra Party acknowledged that the policy of lowering the threshold provides opportunities for small parties. Also for party Gerindra Alone beneficial For strengthening base voice which also become extent of change envisioned. However matter This No give the benefits that strategic And make party Gerindra Want to For nominate independent. The location of decision-making within the party is also a reason it lacks policy motivation. Within Gerindra, the strategic decision-making structure for determining regional head candidates rests with the Central Executive Board (DPP), although it doesn't rule out grassroots proposals. The implementation of the threshold policy is, of course, linked to the implementation of regional elections. The party's policy/program implementers Gerindra involving all over party. Started from DPP, DPW, DPC, Wing party, volunteers, and social media teams. Then, regarding the Gerindra Party's resources No become problem, there is source Power man, financial and sources Power other Which can it is said competent. So that source Power not the reason the Gerindra party is not encouraged to nominate a gubernatorial candidate and representative governor in Java West in a way independent on Regional Election 2024 Then. No pushed party Gerindra in implement policies are influenced by context of implementation. There is influence from power, interest, and strategies of actor involved. That existence pattern domination that DPP As the power holder in the Gerindra Party, there is an interest in winning the regional elections, so the coalition becomes a strategy for the DPP as an actor involved. The Gerindra Party also confirmed that the institutional and regime characteristics influence decision Gerindra as party big Which Prabowo's rise to power and victory. All of this impacted the Gerindra Party's compliance and responsiveness. Although the party responded positively to the threshold reduction, the decision to disobey by implementing the policy and remaining in the coalition was ultimately the party's decision.

Visualization Network Threshold Regional Election Java West Golkar Party




Figure 3. Visualization Network ATLAS.ti Threshold Regional Election Golkar West Java

Network analysis visualization of the Golkar party in the image above can clearly show that the cause of the Golkar party not being encouraged to implement policies by proposing candidate Governor and Representative Governor on Regional Election 2024 caused by two variable content of policy and context of implementation. By two main dimensions that is content of policy in the form of interest affected, type of benefits, extent of change envision, site of decision and resource committed and context of implementation in the form of power, interest and strategies of actors involved, institution & regime characteristics and compliance & responsiveness.

The existence of interest affected in party Golkar in the form of interest Inter-party commitment to following the ideals of the KIM (Advanced Indonesia Coalition), as well as electoral interests. The type of benefit recognized by Gerindra is that the policy of lowering the threshold is beneficial for strengthening the party's base and the extent of Golkar's change envisioning. However, the coalition decision is more beneficial in formulating policies for the future government. Site of decision making party Also become Wrong One reason. Although DPW, members, administrators are involved in decision making but for the figure to be nominated And disconnected owned by DPP, with No close proposal from grassroots. The Gerindra Party's program implementers also involve all levels of the party, including DPP, wing party until grassroot Also There is party outside party that is KPU. Then that resourced committed become reason party Golkar For did not apply the candidate. Although source Power Which Actually abundant Golkar possesses resources such as party and personal finances, non-human resources like logistics and political education. However, Golkar lacks human resources in the form of highly electable cadres.

Then from that, the party is not encouraged to nominate its candidates. caused by by DPP as holder power, existence interest to win Regional Election Also interest For DPP operate creative, so that Forming coalitions and nominating figures with high electability are strategies of actors involved in the Golkar Party. Another reason is that institutional and regime characteristics Also influential Because Golkar concerned For running astracipta in help Prabowo. Will but, the decline number threshold Golkar ignored this policy. It demonstrated compliance by respecting and following the Constitutional Court's ruling, and responsiveness by conducting surveys and political calculations. However, in the final decision, Golkar was not compelled to comply and remained in the coalition.

Visualization Network Threshold Regional Election Java West Party PKS




Figure 4. Visualization Network ATLAS.ti Threshold Regional Election PKS Java West

The visualization of the PKS Party network above shows that after being mapped using the network threshold visualization form, the PKS party was not pushed. For submit the candidate in a way independent seen Because two dimensions The main issues are the content of the policy, including the interests affected, the type of benefit, the extent of change envisioning, and the site of decision-makin. Then, regarding the context of implementation, including the power, interests and strategies of the actors involved, and compliance and responsiveness. PKS has an affected interest in winning the regional elections, as well as influencing interests in the form of nominating internal party cadres. PKS acknowledges that lowering the threshold in this policy provides benefits for the health of democracy and is also beneficial for middle-ranking parties. This policy is also expected (extent of change envisioning) by the PKS party as a change for the general election. forward so that can nominate Alone. Although Tye of benefits And The extent of change in policy envision is acknowledged as positive, but this does not mean that PKS will immediately cancel it. so just communication And coalition Which has happen, matter This related to the injury time of policy decisions. Then the site of decision making is held by DPW PKS, Also including process that DPW Which form The political communications team conducts negotiations and sends candidates. This differs from the previous two parties, where the DPP has the power to decide. PKS itself only provides signatures for the decision letter. Program implementers party PKS in matter implementation specifically Regional Election Governor The selection of the deputy governor involves the Central Executive Board (DPP), Regional Executive Board (DPW), and the BP3 (election winning body). Resources committed to the PKS include human resources in the form of cadres, particularly those nominated by the PKS as gubernatorial candidates, and financial resources from the party and shared funding with the candidate pairs. A lack of resources does not necessarily preclude the party from nominating cadres.

Whereas network visualization threshold context of implementation show that power, interest and strategies of actor involved become the findings of the PKS show that it is not encouraged to nominate candidates independently. The Regional Leadership Council (DPW), as the power holder, has an interest in winning the regional elections while still nominating cadres who make coalition decisions. strategies of the actors involved. Meanwhile institution and regime characteristic recognized No become reason step PKS in Regional elections even though Gerindra And victory Prabowo become dominant and moving the political stage. Meanwhile, the sub-variable of PKS's compliance and responsiveness shows that PKS responded positively to the policy. PKS also continued to make political calculations as a form of compliance. However, the policy, which occurred during injury time, left PKS unprepared to respond. with Good so that PKS choose For No comply implementation while remaining in a coalition which makes the expected outputs and impacts of the policy impossible to realize.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that the failure to implement the threshold policy in the nomination of gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates in West Java, as stipulated in Mahkamah Konstitusi Decision No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024, is attributable to several interrelated factors influencing policy implementation by political parties, which in turn triggered intervention by the Golkar Party and the Gerindra Party. In the case of the Golkar Party, the policy was not implemented primarily due to factors within the content of policy variable. First, Golkar's interest affected centered on strengthening its electoral position in order to win the Pilkada. Second, intervention occurred because political calculations indicated that coalition-building offered greater advantages than independent nomination under the reduced threshold (type of benefit). Third, the sudden and substantial degree of change required by the policy was perceived as posing electoral risks, thereby encouraging intervention (extent of change envisioned). Fourth, although the party formally acknowledged the binding legal authority of the Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK), in political practice the decision became secondary to directives from the Central Executive Board (DPP), which dominated the site of decision making. Fifth, strong internal coordination among policy implementers reinforced the initial coalition decision and thus facilitated intervention rather than compliance (program implementers). Finally, the lack of

sufficiently strong and electable internal candidates constituted a key reason for intervention against full policy implementation (resources committed).

Intervention by the Golkar Party was also shaped by factors within the context of implementation. The DPP's dominant power, combined with its interest in endorsing highly electable figures to secure victory in the Pilkada, and the adoption of coalition-building as the principal strategy of the actors involved, jointly triggered intervention. Furthermore, Prabowo Subianto's presidential victory, Gerindra's dominance, and the commitment to advancing the national coalition agenda through the Asta Cita under Koalisi Indonesia Maju (KIM) influenced Golkar's decision not to implement the policy (institutional and regime characteristics). Low levels of compliance and responsiveness to the policy, reflected in continued reliance on large coalitions, further reinforced intervention. With regard to the Gerindra Party, the key distinction lies in the resources committed variable, as resource availability did not constitute a factor influencing intervention. Gerindra possesses abundant resources, including strong cadres, financial capacity, and organizational infrastructure. Accordingly, the factors driving Gerindra's intervention in the implementation of the threshold policy are primarily related to other variables. Gerindra's dominant interest affected namely, electoral victory and power retention served as a major trigger for intervention. The lack of clear and direct benefits offered by the threshold policy to a large and electorally dominant party generated resistance (type of benefit). The substantial policy change implied by the reduced threshold was perceived as potentially weakening the solid and unified vote base required to secure victory, thereby encouraging resistance and intervention (extent of change envisioned). Although the MK decision was formally respected as legally binding, its authority weakened in the political arena, where the DPP functioned as the central command structure; consequently, DPP decisions represented a direct form of intervention against policy implementation (site of decision making). Strong and cohesive coordination among party implementers to maintain a large coalition further reinforced intervention (program implementers). In contrast, resources committed did not function as a trigger for intervention, as Gerindra did not face any shortage of material or human resources. Intervention by the Gerindra Party was also influenced by the context of implementation. The DPP's dominant power, combined with its interest in maintaining electoral dominance at both national and regional levels, led to the formation and preservation of large coalitions as a core strategy of the actors involved. Gerindra's status as the winning party attracted other parties to align and commit collectively, thereby reinforcing intervention against the threshold policy (institutional and regime characteristics). Finally, low levels of compliance and responsiveness evidenced by continued coalition-based nominations constituted a decisive factor undermining policy implementation.

REFERENCES

- Al Syahrin, M. N. (2024). The strength of figures and characteristics of political party leaders in the 2024 simultaneous regional head election in Indonesia. *Technium Social Sciences Journal*, 59(1), 199–203. <https://doi.org/10.47577/tssj.v59i1.11157>
- Al-Hamdi, R., Sakir, S., & Lailam, T. (2022). Pro and contra of the parliamentary threshold among Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) and political parties: Seeking a relevant model for Indonesia's legislative election. *Journal of Governance and Public Policy*, 9(3), 225–240. <https://doi.org/10.18196/jgpp.v9i3.15149>
- Anggreani, S. (2024). Presidential threshold constitutionality dilemma in Indonesia: A comparative study with Brazil. *Unisia*, 42(1). <https://doi.org/10.20885/unisia.vol42.iss1.art18>
- Ashari, I. N., Nurmiyati, N., Taufik, M., & Hastira, M. F. (2025). Politik tanpa pilihan: Pragmatisme partai politik dalam fenomena kemunculan kolom kosong pada Pilkada Kota Samarinda 2024. *Jurnal Politik Profetik*, 13(2), 114–135. <https://doi.org/10.24252/profetik.v13i2a1>

- Asrinaldi, A., Yusoff, M. A., & Karim, Z. A. (2022). Oligarchy in the Jokowi government and its influence on the implementation of legislative function in Indonesia. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 7(2), 189–203. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891121995564>
- Dinarto, D., & Ng, J. (2021). Characterising independent candidates in Indonesian local politics. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 40(2), 266–292. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420972412>
- Dinarto, D., & Ng, J. (2021). Characterising independent candidates in Indonesian local politics. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 40(2), 266–292.
- Grindle, M. S. (2017). Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World.
- Hanan, D., Astuti, T. S., & Eddyono, L. W. (2025). Electoral reform through the Indonesian Constitutional Court: Constitutionality of presidential candidacy threshold in Indonesia. *Jurnal Konstitusi*, 22(2), 260–292. <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk2223>
- Hannan, A., & Kustanto, M. (2024). Political problems of implementing proportional election systems in Indonesia: From political liberalization to political party oligarchies. *Jurnal Borneo Akcaya*, 10(1). <https://doi.org/10.51266/jba.v10i1.337>
- Herdiansah, A. G., Gutama, A. S., & Sumadinata, W. S. (2022). Assessing the leverage of Islamist groups and opposition parties alliance in Indonesia's regional electoral contest. *Jurnal Politik*, 8(2), Article 4. <https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v8i2.1113>
- Holqi, F. G. F., Handayani, F. F., Astuti, W. P., Permatasari, P. D., & Rahman Putra, R. A. (2025). Fenomena calon tunggal dan arah gerak partai politik pada pemilihan kepala daerah kabupaten/kota 2024. *Jurnal Pemerintahan dan Politik*, 10(1), 110–130. <https://doi.org/10.36982/jpp.v10i1.5105>
- Idrus, I. (2022). Setting the parliamentary threshold (PT) in the context of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning general elections based on people's sovereignty Article 1 Paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. *Al Ahkam*, 18(1). <https://doi.org/10.37035/ajh.v18i1.5726>
- Ikhsan, M., Subhilhar, Kusmanto, H., & Nasution, I. K. (2024). The dynamics of regional head candidate selection and its implications for local democracy: A case study of Medan City, Indonesia. *Journal of Ecohumanism*, 3(4), 32–41. <https://doi.org/10.62754/joe.v3i4.3464>
- Islam, N., & Suryani, E. I. (2026). Dynamics of PKS internal cadre nominations in the 2024 Bandar Lampung City regional elections. *Jurnal Pemerintahan dan Politik*, 11(3), 849–865. <https://doi.org/10.36982/jpp.v11i3.7086>
- Jayanto, D. D. (2025). Integrated electoral cartelization: Indonesia's new cartelization model through competitive intervention in 2024 regional head elections. *Unnes Political Science Journal*, 9(1). <https://doi.org/10.15294/upsj.v9i1.23313>
- Manalu, S. E., & Nurhandjati, N. (2021). Dinamika koalisi partai politik dalam Pilkada Kabupaten Padang Lawas Utara tahun 2018. *Journal Publicuho*, 4(4), 1025–1042. <https://doi.org/10.35817/jpu.v4i4.21282>
- Nadira Kusuma, A. S., & Rohmaning, P. (2025). Local election of Solo 2024: Looking at the role of political parties and coalitions behind the scenes. *Journal of Religion, Local Politics, and Law*, 1(4), 298–309. <https://doi.org/10.64595/jrlpl.v1n4.p298-309>
- Naharuddin, N., & Imran, I. (2024). Deregulating the nomination threshold for regional head elections and local oligarchy. *Amsir Law Journal*, 6(1), 56–67. <https://doi.org/10.36746/alj.v6i1.588>
- Noor, F., Siregar, S. N., Hanafi, R. I., & Sepriwasa, D. (2021). The implementation of direct local election (Pilkada) and money politics tendencies: The current Indonesian case. *Politik*

- Nufus, A. F. I., Herawati, R., & Diamantina, A. (2024). Penerapan presidential threshold sebagai kebijakan hukum terbuka dalam pemilihan umum di Indonesia. *Diponegoro Law Journal*, 13(3). <https://doi.org/10.14710/dlj.2024.43829>
- Nur, R. (2025). Analysis of the changing threshold for regional head candidacy from a utilitarian perspective. *Jurnal Konstitusi*, 22(3), 508–527. <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk2235>
- Prasetio, R. B., & Sianipar, F. (2021). The relevance of the application of the presidential threshold and the implementation of simultaneous elections in Indonesia. *Jurnal Penelitian Hukum De Jure*, 21(2), 267-284.
- Pratama, B. I., Wike, Said, M., Sentanu, I. G. E. P. S., Ari, D. P. S., Alfattahu, N. F., & Pratomo, D. A. (2026). Mapping national and local political coalitions in Indonesia: Multistage social network analysis oversized coalition Governor, Regent, and Mayor Elections 2024. *Cogent Social Sciences*, 12(1), Article 2611443. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2025.2611443>
- Prianto, A. L. (2024). Political party governance as an institutional challenge to the democratic regression in Indonesia. *Journal of Governance and Local Politics*, 6(1). <https://doi.org/10.47650/jglp.v6i1.1304>
- Prianto, A. L., Nurmandi, A., Qodir, Z., & Jubba, H. (2022). Does collective action institutionalize rational choice? Candidate selection in Indonesian political parties. *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs*, 8(3), 63–82. <https://doi.org/10.47305/JLIA2283063p>
- Rahman, M. A. M., Luis, R. F., & Ruslie, A. S. (2023). Indonesia's presidential threshold: An analysis of legal and political dynamics. *Jurnal Mengkaji Indonesia*, 2(2). <https://doi.org/10.59066/jmi.v2i2.401>
- Ridwan, M. A., & Fatkhuri, F. (2023). Dinamika personalisasi partai politik dalam rekrutmen bakal calon Walikota Solo 2020: Studi kasus Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P). *JPW (Jurnal Politik Walisongo)*, 5(1), 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.21580/jpw.v5i1.16789>
- Rohmah, E. I. (2025). Constitutional legitimacy and institutional behavior of political parties in the 2024 regional elections. *Jurnal Konstitusi*, 22(3), 459–482. <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk2233>
- Rusnaedy, Z., Fatma, F., & Haris, A. (2021). Political dynasty and single candidate in Indonesian local elections: Where are the parties? *Journal of Governance and Local Politics*, 3(2), 124–136. <https://doi.org/10.47650/jglp.v3i2.297>
- Saleha, D., Saragih, B. R., & Sulistyowati, T. (2025). Reconstruction of the Threshold Setting for Regional Head Candidacy in the Perspective of Electoral Democracy in Indonesia. *International Journal for Science Review*, 2(8). <https://doi.org/10.71364/ijfsr.v2i8.98>
- Sampe, S. (2021). Why political parties don't and do matter in local government elections in Indonesia: A Manado case. *Revista de Sociologia e Política*, 29(77), e003. <https://doi.org/10.1590/1678-987321297703>
- Setiawan, A. E., Fatmawati, L., & Shulga, I. (2024). Understanding Indonesia's presidential threshold: A study on political rights. *Jurnal Mengkaji Indonesia*, 3(1), 82–103. <https://doi.org/10.59066/jmi.v3i1.622>
- Siddha, A., & Fauzi, L. M. (2022). Integrity and election-winning in Indonesia: How to challenge democracy amidst the oligarchy? *CosmoGov: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan*, 8(2). <https://doi.org/10.24198/cosmogov.v8i2.42530>

- Sisilia, S., Suryanef, S., Rafni, A., & Hamdi, I. (2026). Koalisi partai politik terhadap munculnya calon tunggal pada Pilkada 2024. *Journal of Education, Cultural and Politics*, 6(2), 339–349. <https://doi.org/10.24036/jecco.v6i2.979>
- Sitorus, Y., Pasaribu, I., Putri, R. J., & Efendi, D. (2025). The coalition patterns of political parties in the nomination of regional head candidates in Toba Regency in 2024. *Journal of Politics and Democracy*, 4(2), 91–101. <https://doi.org/10.61183/polikrasi.v4i2.109>
- Sobirin, L. A., Firdaus, M. I. A., Napiah, I., Taufik, T., Rosalina, F., & Hadiana, D. (2026). Reconstructing Electoral Legal Politics in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis of the Ambivalence of the Open Proportional System and Electoral Thresholds Post Constitutional Court Decision No. 55/PUU-XXII/2024. *Politica: Jurnal Hukum Tata Negara dan Politik Islam*, 13(1), 259–274. <https://doi.org/10.32505/politica.v13i1.15454>
- Subekti, D., Rahmadi, D., & Al-Hamdi, R. (2023). The political motives of party elites and public responses in Twitter: The idea of postponing Indonesia's 2024 election. *Masyarakat, Kebudayaan dan Politik*, 36(2), 288–301. <https://doi.org/10.20473/mkp.V36i22023.288-301>
- Sukmawan, D. I., & Pratama, S. (2023). Critical review of the Constitutional Court's decision on the presidential threshold. *Jurnal Konstitusi*, 20(4). <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk2041>
- Sumodiningrat, A. (2021). Meninjau ulang ketentuan presidential threshold dalam pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden di Indonesia. *Jurnal Kajian Pembaruan Hukum*, 1(1). <https://doi.org/10.19184/jkph.v1i1.23349>
- Syafhendry, S., Prianto, A. L., & Yulsaini, N. (2023). Political party preferences on local election in Indonesia: How does rational choice institutionalism work in candidate selection? *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs*, 9(3), 74–97. <https://doi.org/10.47305/JLIA2393063h>
- Taufiqurrohman, M. M. (2021). Meninjau penerapan ambang batas pemilihan pada sistem pemilihan umum proporsional di Indonesia. *Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, 12(1), 128–143. <https://doi.org/10.14710/politika.12.1.2021.128-143>
- Waisapi, J. Y. (2024). A juridical analysis of the implications of Constitutional Court Decision No. 60/PUU/XXII/2024 paving the way for political parties without Regional Representative Council seats in nominating regional heads. *Journal of Law, Politic and Humanities*, 4(6), 2520–2532. <https://doi.org/10.38035/jlph.v4i6.781>
- Yusra, A., Romli, L., & Noor, F. (2022). Seleksi kandidat dalam kontestasi elektoral: Studi kasus pencalonan walikota dan wakil walikota Depok oleh Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) tahun 2005 dan tahun 2020. *Jurnal Penelitian Politik*, 19(1), 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.14203/jpp.v19i1.1132>